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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigated the legal criteria involved in 
resolving defective specification disputes. Appellate case 
law was researched to discover the rules used by the court 
systems to decide cases involving defective specifications. 
These rules were organized in flow chart form to provide a 
guide for construction contract administrators. Separate 
flow charts were prepared for method and performance 
specifications, and the differences between the two types of 
specifications were discussed. Appellate court cases were 
used to illustrate how the courts have interpreted and 
applied the legal rules in construction contract disputes. 
The differences between defective specifications and 
differing site conditions were also investigated. A 
discussion of the significant differences was provided to 
assist construction professionals in distinguishing the two 
dispute situations. 
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Plans and specifications are the instruments used by 
owners to convey the requirements of a construction 
contract. They tell the construction contractor what he is 
expected to do so that he can formulate his bid. They are 
normally prepared by architectural and engineering firms 
hired by the owner, with assistance from various 
consultants. The cost of preparing high quality contract 
documents can be significant, and sometimes the quality of 
the plans is questionable. Even if it were desirable to 
produce perfect documents, the cost to do so would be too 
great. Thus, defective contract documents are not uncommon. 
Not surprisingly, defective specifications are a frequent 
cause of disputes in construction contracting. 
To resolve disputes cvrrectly at the field level, 
contract managers should be familiar with the legal 
principles associated with defective specifications. 
Problem Statement 
The rules used by the courts to resolve defective 
specification disputes are not clearly defined. An 
understanding of these rules is necessary to resolve 
disputes. Also the distinction between defective 




The objective of this thesis is to develop a guidP for 
construction professionals to assist in analyzing and 
resolving disputes involving defective specifications. The 
guide will identify the rules used by the courts to resolve 
disputes, and provide guidance on recognizing defective 
specifications and distinguishing them from differing site 
condition claims. 
Value of Research 
This guide will provide field level personnel with the 
knowledge to correctly identify and resolve defective 
specification disputes. This information will promote 
better contract management and help avoid costly and 
unnecessary litigation. 
Methodology 
A thorough review of the literature available on 
defective specifications was conducted. This review 
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included literature written for the construction industry 
and legal treatises written for law professionals. The 
purpose of this review was to determine the current state of 
knowledge concerning defective specifications, ascertain 
what rules are believed to exist, and determine if these 
rules were consistent among the treatises. From the 
literature review, significant judicial decisions were 
identified which provided the basis for a case review. 
Appellate court decisions relating to defective 
specifications were examined to establish the rules used by 
the courts to resolve disputes. This review was conducted 
according to the following guidelines: 
1) Over 100 appellate court decisions were 
reviewed to establish the rules used by the courts. 
2) Cases were not limited to any particular time 
period or jurisdiction and included cases 
involving public and private owners. 
3) Only construction or construction related cases 
were used to develop and illustrate the rules. 
From the case review, a flow diagram was developed which can 
be used to resolve disputes. 
The rules were verified using the outcome from ten 
recent appellate court decisions. 
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Background 
Project plans and specifications function together to 
describe the contract requirements. The drawings 
graphically show the work to be constructed and include 
location, dimensions, and arrangement of components, 
materials, and systems. The specifications provide 
technical information concerning building materials, 
components, systems and equipment indicated on the drawings 
with respect to quality, performance characteristics, and 
results to be achieved. 1 
The literature indicates that the plans and 
specifications are considered defective if performance is 
impossible, or if the finished product fails or does not 
accomplish its intended results. There are many causes of 
defective specifications. They can be caused by incomplete 
or incorrect information used in the design process, errors 
in judgment or calculations, or inexperienced or incompetent 
designers, to name just a few. 
The landmark legal case dealing with defective 
specifications is the 1918 decision by the Supreme Court in 
United States v. Spearin. Spearin was constructing a 
drydock for the Navy at the Brooklyn Navy Yard in accordance 
with plans and specifications which had been prepared by the 
government. A portion of the contract required Spearin to 
relocate a 6-foot sewer which intersected the site, and the 
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plans prescribed the dimensions, material, and location of 
all sections to be constructed. The sewer subsequently 
failed and flooded the site. The contractor refused to 
continue working, and the Navy terminated the contract. 
The Supreme Court sided with the contractor stating that if 
the contractor is bound to build according to plans and 
specifications prepared by the owner, the contractor will 
not be responsible for the consequences of defects in the 
plans and specifications." 2 This decision was based on 
the principle that when the owner prescribes the character, 
dimension, and locations of the work, there is an implied 
warranty that the plans are sufficient, and the outcome will 
be satisfactory. 
A review of appellate court decisions shows that 
although frequently followed, the Spearin Doctrine does not 
automatically provide relief for a construction contractor, 
and there are notable exceptions to this doctrine. 
Available legal and contract administration treatises 
provide very little guidance relative to the resolution of 
defective specification disputes. Most acknowledge the 
Spearin doctrine in that if a contractor follows defective 
plans and specifications furnished by the owner, he will not 
be responsible for loss or damage which results. Many 
professionals acknowledge exceptions to this rule. There 
are many inconsistencies among treatises, and none 
completely identifies and analyzes the rules applied by 
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courts to resolve defective specification disputes. 
Another problem in the literature is the failure to 
clearly distinguish differing site condition disputes from 
defective specification disputes. Although the two 
sometimes appear to be quite similar, the legal rules ar~ 
quite different. The distinction can be difficult when an 
underground structure such as a building foundation or sewer 
system fails due to a defective design caused by unsuitable 
soil conditions. 
Methods of Recovery 
Courts have developed two methods for resolving 
defective specification disputes depending on whether the 
specification is a method or performance specification. 
Method specifications, sometimes called design 
specifications, tell the contractor what he is expected to 
do, the type of equipment he must use, and the procedure he 
must follow in performing a construction operation. For 
example, a method specification for soil compaction may 
require the contractor to use a certain size and type of 
compactor, and tell him exactly how many passes to make. 
Design specifications provide detailed design information 
such as dimensions, tolerances, materials, etc. For 
example, a design specification for a foundation would 
prescribe the location and dimension of the foundation, 
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size and location of reinforcing steel, required concrete 
strength, and acceptable tolerances. Although technically 
different from a method specification, the terms are 
normally used interchangeably by courts, and the legal rules 
are the same. For design and method specifications, the 
contractor seeks compensation based upon the legal theory of 
implied warranty. 
Performance specifications specify the result which 
must be achieved and leave the method of accomplishment and 
often the design details to the contractor. For the 
compaction example, the contract would specify the desired 
density of soil, and allow the contractor to choose the 
equipment and methods he desires to achieve compaction. For 
this type of specification, there is no implied warranty, 
and the contractor must prove that the specification was 
impossible or commercially impractical. 
Organization 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter 2 
covers disputes involving method specifications while 
Chapter 3 covers performance specifications. The rules used 
by the courts are presented in flow chart form, and are 
discussed in the text. Examples detailing how courts have 
applied the rules are used frequently. Chapter 4 discusses 
the differences between defective specifications and 
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differing site conditions, and provides examples of how a 
contract administrator can use the flow charts developed in 
Chapters 2 and 3. Summary and conclusions are in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 2 
METHOD SPECIFICATIONS 
When a defective specification dispute involves a 
method specification, a contractor seeking additional 
compensation relies upon the theory of implied warranty. 
This chapter focuses first on the theory of implied 
warranties relating to plans and specifications, and then 
discusses the rules used to resolve defective method 
specification disputes. 
Figure 2.1 provides a flow chart of the rules that the 
courts have applied to decide defective method specification 
disputes. The rules are discussed and explained in the 
text, and examples are presented to illustrate how courts 
have applied the rules. 
Implied Warranty 
The general rule in construction contracting is that 
"even though the plans upon which a contractor undertakes to 
construct a building are so defective as to cause the 
building to fall while in the course of erection, he is 
generally not relieved" 3 unless it can be shown that the 
owner expressly or implicitly warrants the sufficiency of 
the plans. 4 The legal theory of implied warranty forms 
10 
I METHOD OR PERFORMANCE? !PERFORMANCE_ I REFER TO FIGURE 3. 1 J 
METHOD 
liS SPECIFICATION DEFECT! VE? ! _NO 
YES 
liS ERROR PATENT? I YES 
I 
NO 
DID CONTRACTOR ASSUME YES 
RISK OF DEFECTIVE SPEC? 
NO 
PRE-COMPLETION LOSS? YES 
NO 
r 
DID CONTRACTOR DEVIATE? YES.. DID OWNER ~ I 
APPROVE? 
No I NO 
r , 
I RECOVERY IS LIKELY. I I RECOVERY Is NOT LIKELY. I 
Figure 2.1 Method Specification Flow Chart 
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the basis of recovery for defective specification disputes. 
Implied warranty is a broad legal theory which applies 
to many aspects of construction contract law. For example, 
there are implied warranties relating to the quality of 
workmanship provided by contractors and the suitability of 
products furnished by manufacturers. For the purposes of 
this thesis, implied warranty is limited to its application 
as it relates to an owner providing plans and specifications 
which a contractor must follow. 
Most courts find that by providing a method 
specification, the owner implicitly warrants that the 
specification is correct. As explained by one court, this 
concept rests on the presumed expertise of an owner where it 
sees fit to prescribe detailed specifications. 5 This view 
was affirmed by the u. s. Supreme Court in u. s. v. Spearin, 
where the court held that if a contractor is bound to build 
according to detailed specifications, the contractor will 
not be responsible for the consequences of the defects. 6 
The argument for an implied warranty rule is 
particularly convincing when the detailed design in question 
is complex, state of the art, or relies on engineering data 
not readily available to the contractor. Foundation 
designs, for example, often fit this latter case, 
particularly when designed for large buildings or h~avy 
loads. The contractor does not have an obligation to 
independently evaluate soil conditions and anticipated 
12 
loading conditions to ascertain if the foundation will 
function properly. The contractor is entitled to rely on 
the accuracy and suitability of the design. 
Method or Performance Specification? 
The determination of whether the specification is a 
method or performance specification is critical since the 
implied warranty of adequacy of specifications applies only 
to method specifications. 7 Method specifications give 
detailed instructions that a contractor must follow or 
design details, dimensions, materials, etc. which the 
contractor must comply with. Performance specifications 
provide only the expectations of the finished product, and 
allow the contractor to choose the method and means to 
achieve that result. 
Of course, many contracts mix performance requirements 
and methods specifications in a single contract, and this 
sometimes makes it difficult for a court to determine which 
legal rules to apply. This issue was discussed in Utility 
Contractors v. u. s. "The court has difficulty in believing 
that every government contract can be placed in such llack 
and white terms as design specification or performance 
contract. The court does not necessarily find that these 
terms have to be so mutually exclusive. Certainly one can 
find numerous government contracts exhibiting both 
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performance and design specification characteristics." 8 
Some courts have examined the contract as a whole to 
determine which type of contract was intended. Such was the 
case in Utility where although there were numerous method 
type specifications, the court found that "at almost every 
step, the contractor was to use its own judgement and 
experience in deciding how, when, where, under what 
conditions, and which proportion would be best for which 
project section." 9 Thus, the court determined that the 
contract was a performance type contract which did not carry 
an implied warranty. 
When possible, courts will isolate the specific cause 
of the failure to determine which type of specification 
controlled. The key factor the court is searching for is 
who chose the method or design which proved inadequate. If 
the contract allowed the contractor to choose the method or 
design which caused the problem, the contractor will have 
difficulty passing the liability for failure to the owner. 
If the contract required the contractor to follow a 
particular method which proves to be the cause of failure 




Is the Specification Defective? 
Although the term defective specification is commonly 
used to describe many types of problems with plans and 
specifications, there are only two general defective 
specification situations: when the product cannot be 
constructed by the method specified, or when the end result 
derived from following the specified method fails or does 
not meet the end requirements. These two situations are 
discussed. 
Product Cannot Be Constructed 
by the Method Specified 
If a contractor is not able to construct the product by 
the method specified or the design provided, he is likely to 
recover. However, he will not recover simply because the 
method is more difficult or expensive than he anticipated. 
Rather, he must show that the method is impossible. He need 
not show that the outcome cannot be obtained by any method, 
but only that the specified method is not possible. A few 
examples illustrate what courts have considered defective. 
The topic of impossibility is also discussed in Chapter 3. 
The plans were considered defective in Laburnum 
Construction Corporation v. United States when the 
contractor laid out an aboveground steam line and discovered 
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that the plans required him to install the line through a 
swamp, a garbage dump, and across the steps of a building. 
The work could not possibly have been constructed as 
designed, and the contractor recovered for his additional 
costs to modify the route and for his delay costs. 10 
Similarly, in J. D. Hedin Construction Company v. United 
States the plans were defective where thin shell sheet piles 
required by the specifications were improper for the soil 
conditions, and could not be successfully driven to form 
pile groups. 11 
In the above cases, the contractors were able to 
recover under the theory of implied warranty because the 
work could not be built as designed. A new design or other 
materials were required. In fact, courts frequently 
interpret agreement by the owner to modify the contract as 
acknowledgment that the specification is defective. 
However, the contractor cannot recover simply because 
the work is more difficult or more expensive than 
anticipated. In Sandy Hites Co. v. State Highway 
Commission, the Missouri Supreme Court ~uled that the 
contractor could not recover the cost of additional material 
required when the required method for concrete paving 
resulted in the thickr.ess of the finished road being greater 
than required by the contract. The court found that the 
specification was not defective simply because the method 
did not result in exactly seven inches of pavement, and that 
the contractor was responsible for the additional cost of 
materia1. 12 
End Product is Unsatisfactory 
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The second common defective specification situation 
results when the end product achieved by following the 
required method does not measure up to expectations. The 
rule is clear and consistent under these circumstances. "In 
the jurisprudence of public contracts, the Government is 
held to warrant that if design plans and specifications are 
flawed, the contractor will not be liable for defective 
performance or products" 13 Thus, if the finished product 
is inadequate due to a defective method specification, the 
contractor will normally not be liable. 
Frequently, problems arise when the contract contains 
both a detailed method which the contractor must follow and 
a specified outcome that the method must achieve. If the 
contractor shows that the method is defective and won't 
result in a suitable finished product, he will normally not 
be responsible for the unsatisfactory results. Several 
examples illustrate this situation. 
The specification was considered defective in ~Cree 
and Co•pany v. State when the contractor was unable to 
achieve the compaction required by the contract when the 
contract also included a detailed method specification which 
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the contractor was required to follow. 14 
S]milarly, an Illinois court ruled that the 
specification was defective in w. H. Lyman Construction Co. 
v. Village of Gurnee when the required method for sealing 
manhole bases did not result in the manholes meeting the 
infiltration limits required by the contract. 15 
Another common source of dispute is when the final 
outcome fails or does not satisfy the own~r. Typically, 
disputes occur when the owner requires the contractor to 
correct or redo the unacceptable outcome or failure. Again, 
the contractor will be allowed to recover if the shortcoming 
is due to an inadequate specification. 
For example, a contractor recovered the expense of 
removing and replacing joint sealer which exhibited lack of 
bonding, tackiness, variation in depth, and other problems. 
The contractor proved that he had fvllowed the owner's 
detailed specification using the specified material which 
was tested and approved by the owner. The court concluded 
that the numerous deficiencies were caused by improper 
materials and methods required by the contract. 16 
In Puget Sound Nat. Bank v. c. B. Lauch Construction 
Co. the owner required the contractor to apply a third coat 
of paint to an apartment complex when the required two coats 
showed excessive fading. The court, in awarding 
compensation to the contractor noted, "The contract called 
for a two coat paint job, not three, and whether the job was 
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sufficient or not, it was the specification under which [the 
contractor] did the painting ... He was to apply two coats of 
paint of a specified kind, and whether or not it was 
sufficient was a matter which [the contractor] had no 
control." 17 
Following the Specification 
May Not Be Sufficient 
To recover under the theory of implied warranty, the 
contractor must prove that the plans are defective. It may 
not be sufficient for the contractor simply to show that he 
followed the plans and specifications and the results were 
not successful. He frequently must prove that the 
specification was defective. This issue was explored in 
Mayvi11e-Port1and Schoo1, Etc. v. c. L. Linfoot, when the 
contractor refused to repair or replace a tank he installed 
which was discovered to have been damaged and unfit for its 
intended purpose. Linfoot claimed he installed the tank 
according to the plans and specifications, and therefore, 
he was not responsible for the damage. The court stated, 
"These North Dakota Cases and the cases cited from other 
jurisdictions, therefore do not automatically relieve the 
contractor of liability for defects when he has followed 
plans and specifications furnished by the other party. ~~e 
contractor; however, may be relieved of liability if the 
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plans or specifications furnished by the other party were 
defective or insufficient, and such defects or insufficiency 
caused the damage complained of." 18 The contractor was 
forced to pay for a new tank when he failed to prove that 
the plans and specifications were defective or insufficient. 
The Mayvi11e-Port1and decision discussed several cases 
which used slightly different wording which would imply that 
the contractor simply has to show that he followed the plans 
and specifications and does not have to show that the plans 
were defective. The court noted however, that the plans 
were, in fact, defective in all these cases. 19 No cases 
were discovered where a contractor was able to recover 
without showing that the plans or specifications were 
defective. Occasionally, though, the courts have concluded 
that the specifications were defective by the process of 
elimination. If the contractor can prove that he followed 
the specification, and all other possible causes of failure 
are eliminated, the court may conclude that the 
specification must have been defective. A finding that the 
specification is defective is critical. 
Is Error Patent? 
An exception to the implied warranty rule exists when 
the contractor knows, or should have known, that the 
specifications are defective. When faced with a significant 
20 
and obvious omission, inconsistency, or discrepancy, the 
contractor has a duty to call it to the attention of the 
owner. 20 One court described this duty as based on the 
principle that a contractor cannot knowingly produce 
something useless and charge the customer for it. 21 To be 
considered obvious under this rule, the error must be 
glaring and significant. this research yielded few cases 
that contained errors so obvious and glaring as to compel 
the court to invoke the patent ambiguity rule. 
One error which was considered patent was discussed in 
A11ied Contractors, Inc. v. United States. Allied was 
constructing a "Nike Launching Area" for the Corps of 
Engineers. The contract required the contractor to 
construct two unsupported four-inch thick masonry walls 
against a soil bank. The contract did not require any 
support for the walls, but later in the project the walls 
were to be waterproofed and backed by a two-foot thick 
concrete wall. As a result of heavy rains, hydrostatic 
pressure caused the masonry walls to collapse. The 
contractor claimed that it built the walls exactly as called 
for by the plans, and that improper design was the cause of 
the failure. Rejecting the contractors argument, the court 
found "it is not true that [Allied] was justified in 
blithely proceeding with its work in the face of obvious and 
recognized errors. The obligation was cast upon [the 
contractor] to do something about it." 22 
-----------------------------------
21 
This patent error rule does not, however, protect 
the owner from liability when a contractor discovers a 
significant error and calls the owners attention to it. In 
Ridley Invest•ent Coapany v. Croll, a court found the owner 
responsible where the contractor notified the owner of a 
defective design due to unsuitable soil under a floor slab. 
The owner directed the contractor to continue the project 
without making provisions for additional support for the 
floor, and excessive settlement caused damage to the 
facility. 23 
Did Contractor Assume Risk of 
Defective Specifications? 
Owners frequently include exculpatory clauses and 
warranty provisions in the contract which attempt to shift 
responsibility for the adequacy of the plans and 
specifications from themselves to the contractor. 
Disclaimers and exculpatory clauses are rarely successful 
when the owner has provided a detailed design which the 
contractor is required to follow. Warranty clauses are 
occasionally so specific that the risk of the specifications 
being defective shifts to the contractor. Contractors 
should study the wording of the contract prior to bidding to 
ascertain the extent of the warranty clause. 
22 
Disclaimers and Exculpatory Clauses 
Exculpatory clauses are frequently included to 
relieve a party from negligence or liability for damages. 
They are generally valid and will be enforced unless (1) it 
would be against public policy, or (2) there is something in 
the social relationship of the parties militating against 
upholding the agreement. 24 Exculpatory clauses are 
however, not favored by courts and will be strictly 
construed against the party seeking to benefit from them. 
It has long been held that general disclaimers such as 
those requiring the contractor to visit the construction 
site, and to check the plans and specifications have little 
or no affect on the implied warranty of the sufficiency of 
the plans and specifications. As stated in Spearin: 
The obligation to examine the site did not 
impose upon him the duty of making a diligent 
inquiry into the history of the locality, with a 
view to determining, at his peril, whether the 
sewer specifically prescribed by the government 
would prove adequate. The duty to check plans did 
not impose the obligation to pass upon their 
adequacy to accomplish the purpose in view. And the 
provision concerning contractors responsibility 
cannot be construed as abridging rights arising 
under specific provisions of the contract. 25 
23 
Courts have consistently held that a disclaimer must be 
specific, and that general disclaimer clauses similar to 
those in Spearin and in most government contracts do not 
relieve the owner of liability for defective specifications. 
Clauses which specifically disclaim responsibility for 
the adequacy of the design are sometimes used and are 
occasionally determined to be valid. A clause included in 
the contract in Philadelphia Housing Authority v. Turner 
Construction Co. serves as an example. The method 
specification for interior painting for a housing 
development was defective, and the contractor was forced to 
use a different and more expensive paint than specified in 
the contract. However, the contract also included a 
specific end result, and contained the following exculpatory 
clause: 
By submitting a bid the bidder agrees that he has 
examined the site and the specification and 
drawings, and where the specification requires in 
any part of the work a given result to be produced, 
that the specifications and drawings are adequate 
and the required result can be produced under the 
specification and drawings. No claim for any 
extra work will be allowed because of alleged 
impossibilities in the production of the results 
specified or because of inadequate or improper 
plans and specifications and wherever a result is 
required, the successful bidder shall furnish any 
and all extras and make any changes needed to 
produce, to the satisfaction of the local 
authority, the required result.26 
24 
The court found the clause to be valid. Although the 
specification was defective, the contractor was unable to 
recover additional costs. 
However, specific disclaimers may be scrutinized 
closely by the court and found to be not valid. In w. H. 
Lyaan Const. Co. v. Vi11age of Gurnee, in addition to the 
detailed design for the submerged manhole bases, the 
specification included a clause holding the contractor 
solely responsible for meeting the infiltration limits set 
in the contract. The provision required the contractor to 
indicate in writing with his proposal if he could not comply 
with the infiltration requirements. The method required by 
the specifications proved defective and the contractor 
eventually received permission to seal the manhole bases 
using a method prohibited by the plans and specifications. 
The court found the disclaimer to be an impermissible 
attempt to shift responsibility for the adequacy of the 
specifications without providing the contractor the 
opportunity to choose the method of sealing the bases. This 
provision was determined to be against settled public policy 




Most warranty clauses, such as the standard American 
Institute of Architects' Guaranty Clause, require the 
contractor to remedy any defects caused by faulty materials 
and workmanship which appear within a specified time period, 
usually one year. The most recent AIA Warranty Clause is 
included in Appendix A. 
Although occasionally challenged, courts have 
consistently held that, when a warranty clause extends only 
to materials and workmanship, the contractor will not be 
liable for a failure due to a defective design. The court 
in Teufel v. Wienir confirmed that under a contract 
utilizing a standard AIA warranty clause, the contractor is 
not liable if the item's failure to function properly is due 
to defective design. 28 
Occasionally, however, warranty clauses are written in 
such a manner that the contractor guarantees the performance 
of the finished product regardless of the reason it fails or 
is defective. When more comprehensive clauses are included 
in thP contract, the court may find that the contractor is 
responsible for failure even if it was caused by defective 
design. In Shopping Center Manag~nt Co~any v. Rupp, the 
contractor was held responsible for equipment whose failure 
26 
was due to a defective design. The contractor provided two 
submersible sewage pumps which met contract requirements, 
were approved by the owner's architect, and installed 
according to the plans. Shortly after installation, the 
pumps failed because the pumps were not built to operate 
under the conditions that the owner's design required. The 
contract warranty provided that "The contractor shall 
guarantee the satisfactory operation of all materials and 
equipment installed under this contract, and shall repair or 
replace, to the satisfaction of the owner or architect, any 
defective material, equipment, or workmanship which may show 
itself within one year after the date of final 
acceptance." 29 The court held that, under the language of 
the guarantee, the contractor assumed the risk that the 
equipment installed by him would operate satisfactorily 
Another court came to a similar conclusion that the 
warranty clause required the contractor to guarantee the 
installation of a heating system which failed due to a 
defective design. The warranty clause held the contractor 
responsible "for anything that goes wrong a year from the 
date of completion." Although the contract required the 
work to be done in strict accordance to plans and 
specifications, and there was no evidence that he did not 
conform to the requirements, the court held that the 
contractor made an express and comprehensive warranty that 
the heating system would give reasonably satisfactory 
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performance for a year after its ins~allation. 30 
Courts will likely examine a warranty clause as well as 
other contract clauses and apply the rules of contract 
interpretation to ensure that the interpretation of the 
clause is reasonable and in harmony with the general intent 
of the contract. In Kur1and v. United Pacific Insurance 
Co•pany, the court found that a guarantee that a cooling 
system would establish at least a 30-degree variation from 
outside temperature for cooling constituted a statement of 
purpose sought to be achieved by means of the owners plans 
and specifications where the contractor was required to 
follow a detailed design. The court concluded that the 
system was inadequately designed, and that "the 
subcontractor did not warrant or guarantee that the system 
. 
embodied in the architect's plans and specifications would 
produce the desired variation for cooling of the apartment 
building. 31 
Firm guidance cannot be provided as to when the court 
will find a warranty clause valid and binding for defective 
specifications. If the wording is clear and specifically 
includes defective specifications as one item covered by the 
warranty, the court will likely uphold the clause. When the 
clause is less explicit, the court will examine other 
contract clauses and perhaps the actions of both parties to 
determine the intent of the warranty clause. Generally, the 
court will be hesitant to shift the risk cf the adequacy of 
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the design unless the c~ntract has clearly spelled out the 
intent that the risk was shifted to the contractor. 
Other Contract Clauses 
Occasionally, courts have found that a clause or 
combination of clauses included in the contract limits the 
implied warranty of the specifications. For example, the 
court in ~erald Forest Utility District v. Si•onsen 
Construction found that a combination of clauses amounted to 
an express guarantee to provide a working sewer free from 
defects. Although the owner failed to provide sufficient 
plans and specifications, the court determined that the 
owner did not implicitly warrant the plans. Instead, a 
clause requiring the contractor "to complete the structure 
according to the contract and to prepare the site and 
structure in a workable condition for final acceptance" 32 
combined with a provision that all work be "able to pass any 
inspection, tests or approvals provided for in the 
contract"3 3 was an express warranty that the sewer line 
would be completed and acceptable. 
A similar decision was reached by the Louisiana Supreme 
Court in Brasher v. City of Alexandria. The court concluded 
that, after consideration of the contract clauses and the 
facts and circumstances of the case, there was no implied 
warranty as to the sufficiency of the plans. Instead, the 
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court interpreted a clause requiring the contractor to 
"correct any deficiencies existing in the sewers, manholes 
or other appurtenances, and put the entire system in working 
condition" 34 to be an express requirement to provide a 
complete working sewer system. 
Precompletion Loss 
A specification is considered defective and carries an 
implied warranty when the work cannot be performed as shown, 
and when the end result fails or does not meet the end 
requirements. One situation where an implied warranty may 
not hold is when failure occurs prior to completion of the 
structure. Unless the contract provides otherwise, the 
contractor is normally responsible for protection of his 
work during construction, and the impliPd wnrr~~~y will not 
extend to precompletion loss. As explained by one court: 
... we cannot find on the record in this case that 
compliance with the plans and specifications would 
produce anything other than satisfactory results. 
The evidence is that the completed drainage ditch 
is satisfactorily performing the function for which it 
was designed ... It is true that the design did not 
prevent damage while the ditch was in an uncompleted 
state. But the government was under no obligation 
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that it do so ... 35 
Thus, the owner does not warrant that a partially 
completed structure will not be damaged, and he does not 
have an obligation to design a structure such that it is 
impermeable to any damage during the course of construction. 
As stated in Uti1ity Contractors. Inc. v. u.s., "absent any 
contract provision to the contrary, the government 
implicitly warrants that satisfactory performance will 
result. This is not a warranty against pre-completion 
losses unless they are caused by compliance with governments 
defective design specifications."36 
In Uti1ity, the court determined that the owner "was 
not required to design this project or provide protective 
measures so the project could be built under all situations, 
including heavy rainstorms ... 37 The contractor was unable 
to recover damages when heavy runoff damag~d uncompleted 
concrete sections since the contractor was required to 
possess sufficient expertise and knowledge to protect his 
unfinished work. 
Finished Product Would Have Failed 
An exception to this rule may exist if the pre-
completion loss is caused by compliance with the defective 
specification. Thus, if the contractor can show that the 
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finished product would have failed anyway he will likely be 
able to recover. 
B1ue Be11, Inc. v. Cassidy illustrates this exception. 
During the course of construction of an industrial type 
building, two building columns failed due to excessive soil 
settlement, and a portion of the roof collapsed. There was 
no evidence that the contractor was negligent in protecting 
his uncompleted work, and the evidence indicated that the 
columns would have failed even if the structure was 
complete. In this situation, the contractor was not liable 
for the building failure.38 
A similar decision was reached in Mi11er v. Guy H. 
Ja•es Construction Co. where the contractor was awarded his 
costs to repair damage caused when heavy rains washed out 
his partially completed ditch liner. The court allowed 
recovery since the final design slope was too steep and 
allowed the run-off water to flow at excessive velocity. 
The drainage system design was defective, and the finished 
project would likely have been damaged even if completed as 
designed. 39 
Thus, the r.ontractor is allowed to recover when the 
defect would have caused damage to the end product, and 
cannot be labeled pre-completion loss. If the damage is 
caused by the contractors failure to protect work which has 
not been completed, he is not likely to recover. 
L __ 
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Did Contractor Follow Plans and Specifications? 
The final exception to the implied warranty rule exists 
when the contractor deviates from the specification - even 
if the specification is defective and cannot be constructed 
as required or will not result in a satisfactory end 
product. This exception is based on the general rule that 
when an owner specifies a particular method or design, the 
contractor has no right to depart from those plans and 
specifications. If a contractor does depart from the 
contract without permission, he becomes the guarantor of the 
strength and safety of the structure. 40 This rule applies 
even if the plans and specifications are defective. 41 
This rule was invoked in Va11ey Construction Co. v. 
Lake Bi11s Sever District when the contractor deviated from 
the specifications while installing a sewer line. The 
contract required the contractor to hand shape the trench 
bottom so that the pipe would rest uniformly on the shaped 
trench bottom. During excavation, the contractor 
encountered hardpan material, and determined tha~ 
handshaping was impossible. He orally requested permission 
to use bedding avel, which was a unit price pay item 
requiring permission from the engineer. When the engineer 
disapproved his request, the contractor chose to deviate 
from the contract by using a cushion course method for 
installing the pipe. When 48 sections of the pipe which the 
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contractor installed using this method broke after a heavy 
rain, the contractor refused to replace the broken sections, 
claiming the damage was caused by an impossible 
specification. The court acknowledged that expert witnesses 
agreed that bedding material was required and that 
handshaping the trench was not an adequate method, but 
stated "Be that as it may, respondents agreed to follow the 
specifications provided by appellant, as long as they did 
so, they would not be liable for any disastrous 
consequences." The court further stated that the contractor 
"would only be discharged from nonperformance or poor 
workmanship by following the specifications." 42 
In Robert G. Regan v. Fiocchi, a masonry subcontractor 
installing brick veneer walls did not install wall ties at 
the spacing required by the specification. When several 
walls bulged, the deviation was discovered and the 
subcontractor was ordered to correct the condition. The 
subcontractor refused to remove the bricks and install the 
required ties. The court discounted expert testimony by an 
architectural engineer that the walls would have bulged even 
if the specifications were followed. The court found the 
evidence immaterial when the contractor chose to depart from 
the specifications.43 
The contractor might be able to overcome this rule if 
he can show that the deviation was minor and had nothing to 
do with the failure. For example, in Burke City Pub1ic 
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Schoo1, Etc. v. Juno Construction, the contractor was able 
to recover when he proved that the damage to a roof was not 
caused by his slight deviations from the specification, but 
rather that the failure was caused solely by the defective 
design. The court held that the owner was required to prove 
that the breach of contract contributed to the damages 
sustained by the owner.44 
Clearly however, all cases demonstrate that the 
contractor is placing himself at risk when he deviates from 
the plans and specifications which he has agreed to follow. 
Did the Owner Approve the Deviation? 
The contractor will, however, be likely to recover his 
costs if the owner approves the deviation. w. H. Ly.an v. 
Vi11age of Gurnee is a recent case which illustrates this 
point. The Village contended that the contractor was liable 
for additional costs since he deviated from the 
specifications to seal the manhole bases. The court 
rejected this argument since the deviation was approved by 
the supervising engineer.45 
Owner Acceptance and Knowledge 
The contractor will also be likely to recover if the 
owner knows of a deviation, but accepts the completed 
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structure anyway. The rule, as stated by one court holds 
that "Where the owner accepts a structure without 
complaining, within a reasonable time, of defects or 
contract deviations which are known to him or which are 
open, obvious and apparent, he is precluded from seeking 
damages for those defects or deviations ... 4 6 
The courts may also find that the contractor can 
recover simply because the owner had knowledge of a 
deviation and did nothing. The results, however, are not as 
predictable as when the structure has been accepted. For 
example, the engineer in Va11ey Construction Co. v. Lake 
Hi11s Sever District knew of the deviation and described the 
work as excellent. The court rejected this argument by the 
contractor since the contract required all changes to be in 
writing. 47 
A complete analysis of when knowledge is sufficient to 
establish acceptance is beyond the scope of this paper, and 
will not be discussed further. To avoid problems, the owner 
or his representative should promptly notify the contractor 
of non-conforming work to which he objects. 
Chapter 3 
PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATIONS 
This chapter focuses on the rules followed by the 
courts in disputes involving performance specifications. 
Figure 3.1 shows the rules the courts have followed to 
resolve performance specification disputes. When a dispute 
involves a performance specification, courts apply the rules 
of impossibility. These rules place a greater share of the 
risk on the contractor. 
The primary feature of a performance specification is 
that it will "set forth an objective or standard to be 
achieved, and the successful bidder is expected to exercise 
his ingenuity in achieving that objective or standard of 
performance, selecting the means and assuming a 
corresponding responsibility for that selection." 48 
Was Performance Impossible 
or Commercially Impractical? 
A performance specification is defective only if the 
requirement set forth is impossible or commercially 
impractical. Absolute impossibility implies that the work 
is physically impossible or beyond the state of the art. 
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Figure 3.1 Performance Specification Flow Chart 
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possible, but at great cost. As stated by Williston 
~he true distinction is not between difficulty and 
impossibility. A man may contract to do what is 
impossible as well as what is difficult, and be liable 
for failure to perform. The important question is 
whether an unanticipated circumstance has made per-
formance of the promise vitally different from what 
should reasonably have been within the contemplation 
of both parties when they entered into the contract. 
If so, the risk should not be thrown on the 
promisor. 49 
Thus, a contractor can recover for the difficulty or added 
cost if he can show that the difficulty is beyond what the 
parties contemplated when the contract was made. It is not 
really important how much more difficult the work must be to 
qualify as commercially impractical. There are no specific 
criteria. As stated by one court: 
The doctrine ultimately represents the ever-shifting 
line, draW!l by courts hopefully responsive to 
commercial practice and mores, at which the 
community's interest in having contracts en-
forced according to their terms is outweighed 
by the commercial senselessness of requiring 
performance. 50 
To determine what the parties contemplated, courts may 
examine the entire contract plus the actions of the parties. 
-----·---·- ---···------· ·---
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For example, if the work required the contractor to use a 
special pi~ce of equipment or method which ~as clearly not 
envisioned by the contract, this fact might be an indication 
that the difficulty was beyond what was contemplated. 
Another indicator might be if the difficulty was so great 
that the contractor could never have completed the project 
within the scheduled completion date. 
The decision in Toabigbee Constructors, Inc. v. United 
States illustrates where a court found a performance 
specification commercially impractical. Although the 
contractor was able to achieve the required 95 percent 
compaction on the first half of the project, the court was 
influenced by testimony that "compaction was achieved 
slowly, with difficulty and great cost, with the use of a 
variety of equipment, and without possibility of meeting the 
construction schedule" 51 The court also found it 
significant that, approximately half way through the job, 
the owner consented to a change order to allow the 
contractor to add Portland Cement to the soil for the 
remainder of the project. The court treated the change 
order as an admission that the compaction could not be 
achieved within the time set forth by the contract. 
The Toabigbee case is contrasted by Baton Rouge 
Contracting Co. v. West Hatchie Drainage Dist., where the 
contractor was unable to recover additional costs when he 
encountered difficulty maintaining a required 1:1 slope on 
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the bank of a channel he was dredging. The contractor 
argued that the 1:1 slope was defective, and a flatter slope 
was more desirable. The court ruled against the contractor 
since, even though it was more difficult than he had 
anticipated, he was able to achieve the slope according to 
the contract requirements, and the project was completed 
within the specified time. 52 The significant difference 
between the two cases was not the degree of difficulty 
encountered, but the difficulty appearing to be beyond the 
contemplation of the parties. 
Performance Must Be Impossible by Any Method 
Since the contractor is not limited to one particular 
method, he has the added burden of showing that the outcome 
could not be met by any reasonable method, and not just the 
one he chose. In Koppers Coapany v. United States the court 
held that the contractor did not prove that the 
specification to produce runway mats for the Corps of 
Engineers was impossible or commercially impractical. The 
contractor chose to abandon his efforts to produce the 
matting when his first attempts to meet strength 
requirements were unsuccessful. He refused to use a 
different core material or alter his fabrication procedures 
to produce a mat which complied with the specification. 
Based on his initial attempts, he concluded that the 
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specification was commercially impractical. The court found 
that the contractor did not show that "a competent 
contractor either could not have performed the contract or 
that performance involved unreasonable and excessive 
costs." 53 
Subjective or Objective Impossibility? 
Impossibility can be divided into two categories -
objective and subjective. Impossibility may be due to the 
nature of the work to be done or to the capacity of the 
promisor to do it. The difference can be thought of as the 
difference between "it cannot be done" (Objective), and "I 
cannot do it" (Subjective). 54 A contractor cannot be 
excused from performing his contract due to subjective 
performance. Instead, he must show that the impossibility 
was due to the nature of the work and not due to his 
inability to perform. Two cases will illustrate this point. 
In Ballou v. Basic Construction Co~any, the contractor 
was found in breach of his contract when he failed to 
manufacture two hundred acceptable pre-cast concrete 
columns. The contractor argued that the columps, as 
designed, were extremely difficult to construct, and that 
the tight constructio~ schedule required by the contract 
made performance commercially impractical. The court found 
that the columns were possible to manufacture since the 
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contractor had manufactured 45 columns, and that the failure 
to manufacture the columns was purely subjective. No 
objective impossibility was shown. Simply because he could 
not manufacture 200 acceptable columns within the allotted 
time did not excuse performance. 55 
A similar decision was reached in D's Co~any Inc. v. 
B. P. Barber and Associates, Inc. where a subcontractor 
claimed that installation of two water mains under a river 
was impossible when two attempts to install the lines were 
unsuccessful. The court rejected the sub-contractor's claim 
since another contractor was able to complete the project by 
employing an alternate method of installation. The court 
found that "the evidence shows this to be a most difficult 
job requiring an experienced crew and proper equipment, but 
the trial judge found that it was not impossible to perform. 
It appeared most difficult or perhaps impossible for the B's 
Co. but apparently a routine operation for an experienced 
operator in the field." 56 The court concluded that 
impo~sibility which is personal to the promisor and is not 
inherent in the nature of the work to be performed, does not 
excuse nonperformance of a contractual oblig~tion. 
Did the Contractor Assume the Risk of Impossibility? 
If a specification is shown to be impossible or 
commercially impractical, the contractor may not recover if 
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it can be shown that he assumed the risk of impossibility. 
This assumption of risk generally occurs when a contract 
clause specifically places the risk on the contractor, or 
it can be shown that the owner has relied upon the 
contractor. Similar to a method specification dispute, the 
clause must be specific, and it must be clear that the risk 
of impossibility has been placed on the contractor. 
However, a court may be more likely to enforce a clause 
shifting the risk to the contractor when a performance 
specification hau been used. 
Reliance on the Contractor's Knowledge or Experience 
A contractor may also assume the risk of impossibility 
if it can be shown that the owner or designer has relied on 
the knowledge or expertise of the contractor. Unlike a 
method specification, where the owner is presumed to possess 
the expertise since he has chosen to spell out the method, a 
contractor can more easily be held to assume the risk of 
performance with a performance specification. Although this 
situation is uncommon with most routine or common 
construction operations, it can occur if a project is 
utilizing a new or state of the art construction technique 
or product. Under these circumstances, a contractor may 
possess information or expertise superior to the designer. 
If the owner relies on the expertise of the contractor, risk 
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of failure may shift to the contractor. According to one 
court, the issue of who assumed the risk rests on two 
questions: (1) Which party had the greatest expertise in 
the subject matter, and (2) Which party took the initiative 
in drawing up the specifications and promoting a particular 
design? 57 
Although there are few construction contract cases 
where this criteria has been met, some examples exist. The 
case most often cited is Beth1ehem Corporation v. United 
States. 58 In this case, the Army contracted for the 
construction of an environmental test chamber. Since the 
designers had very limited experience in the design of this 
type of structure, they consulted Bethlehem Corporation 
concerning the performance characteristics which were 
achievable. Bethlehem was a known expert in the field, and 
advised the designers on the limits of possible performance. 
This advice was used by the designer to develop the 
specification, and the specification was later revised 
during advertisement based on a review by Bethlehem. 
Bethlehem then bid on the project and Wqs subsequently 
awarded the contract. The chamber was constructed, but was 
unable to meet the performance requirements for control of 
relative humidity. The court determined that the 
specification was impossible to perform, but that the 
contractor had assumed the risk of non-performance. 
Bethlehem was aware that it was being consulted as a leader 
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in the field and that the project designers did not have 
expert knowledge. The court found that the owner relied 
upon the representations of the contractor in developing the 
specification. 59 
This case is contrasted by the decision in City of 
Littleton v. Employers Fire Insurance where the court 
refused to find that the contractor had assumed the risk of 
impossibility. During the course of construction, the two 
five-million-gallon water tanks collapsed. The parties 
later entered into a supplemental agreement for 
reconstruction, but the contractor subsequently refused to 
attempt reconstruction when he determined that the revised 
design was impossible to construct without the tanks' 
collapsing again. Both the contract and the supplemental 
agreement were based on engineering provided by the owner, 
and there was no showing that the contractor possessed any 
superior expert knowledge. Additionally, there was nothing 
in the contract which could be construed as shifting the 
risk of impossibility to the contractor.6° 
Chapter 4 
DEFECTIVE SPECIFICATIONS VERSUS DIFFERING SITE CONDITIONS 
It is not always clear if the dispute should be treated 
as a differing site condition (DSC) or a defective 
specification. Both result in the contractor expending more 
effort and expense than anticipated. However, each 
situation has different criteria which must be met, and 
recovery is pursued under different legal theories. This 
chapter discusses the most significant differences. The 
chapter concludes with an example showing the application of 
the defective specification flow charts, and a listing of 10 
cases which were analyzed using the flow charts to validate 
the rules. 
Information or Instructions? 
The primary difference between defective specifications 
and differing site conditions is the type of information at 
issue. Differing site conditions deal with information 
about the conditions to be encountered while defective 
specifications deal with instructions or details of 
construction. As discussed in one differing site conditions 
case, "Bidders are thereby given information on which they 
may rely in making their bids, and are at the same time 
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promised an equitable adjustment under the changed 
conditions clause, if subsurface conditions turn out to be 
different than those indicated ... " 61 (underlining added) 
Conversely, defective specification claims are based on 
faulty instructions or design details provided to the 
contractor which turn out to be inadequate. 
Difficulty in Completing the Work 
If the conditions are different than stated or as 
indicated in the contract, under a DSC claim, the contractor 
may be compensated if the work proves to be more difficult. 
Under defective specifications, the contractor will not be 
compensated because of the work is more difficult than he 
anticipated. As seen in Baton Rouge Contracting Co. 
discussed earlier, a contractor cannot be compensated for 
difficulty. Instead, he has the burden to prove that the 
work was impossible or commercially impractical. 
Reliance 
Another significant difference in recovery between the 
two deals with reliance. With a DSC claim, it is necessary 
to show that the contractor relied upon the information 
which the owner has provided. 62 With defective method 
specifications, it is not necessary to show that the 
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contractor has relied upon the design since he has no 
choice. He was required to follow the design provided by 
the owner. 
Legal Theories 
Defective specification cases are normally argued under 
the theory of implied warranty or impossibility while DSC 
claims are presented under misrepresentation or the rules 
established when a DSC clause is present. Sometimes, DSC 
claims are also argued under the theory of implied warranty. 
The argument is that the owner implicitly warrants that 
information provided to the contractor is accurate. 
However, the rules for recovery are generally the same as 
those for misrepresentation.63 
Occasionally, a contractor will present a defective 
specification claim based upon misrepresentation. Jasper 
Construction Inc. v. Foothi11s Junior Co11ege District is 
one such case. The contractor argued unsuccessfully that 
the specification was defective since it misrepresented the 
method that the contractor could use to construct concrete 
walls. 64 In this case, the court applied the legal 
principles of misrepresentation. 
Contractors sometimes pursue recovery under both 
defective specification and differing site conditions. In 
Stuyvesant Dredging Co. v. United States, the contractor was 
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unable to recover for difficulty encountered while dredging 
where the court ruled that neither defective specifications 
or differing site conditions contributed to the 
difficulties. The court determined that the contractor 
failed to consult Corps of Engineering records which would 
have alerted him to the true conditions of the channel, and 
that the contract was a performance specification which did 
not carry an implied warranty.65 
However, in Foster Construction C.A. and Williams Bros. 
Co. v. United States, the contractor was able to recover for 
both changed conditions and defective specifications. The 
conditions encountered in constructing bridge piers were 
different than those indicated in the contract, allowing the 
contractor to recover for differing site conditions. The 
conditions also made the design inadequate, and the 
contractor recovered for additional costs for constructing 
redesigned concrete piers.66 
Example of Flow Chart Use 
To demonstrate the use of the flow charts, the dispute 
in J. L. si .. ons v. United States 67 will be analyzed. 
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Statement of Facts 
In October 1949, the Veteran's Administration awarded a 
contract for approximately 7 million dollars to J. L. 
Simmons Company for the construction of a hospital and 
related facilities in Chicago, Illinois. 
During construction of the pile foundations for the 
hospital building, it was discovered that the cast-in-place 
concrete piles would not support the design loads. To 
correct the problem, the owner substituted a composite type 
pile. The revised specification prescribed in detail the 
methods and procedures for driving and forming the piles. 
For example, "The casing and a close fitting int8rior core 
were to be driven to a depth approximately equivalent to the 
length of the upper section of the pile. The core was then 
to be removed and a pipe section inserted. The core was 
then to be replaced and the pipe section driven to the 
required penetration and bearing." 68 The contractor 
proceeded with the installation of the pile foundations. 
After nearly 1,700 piles had been driven, the contractor 
detected movement in some of the pile clusters and notified 
the owner. After a complete evaluation of the piles 
installed, extensive restoration work was required to 
correct the movement problems. This corrective action was 
the primary subject of this dispute. 
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Analysis 
The relevant questions from Figure 2.1 are discussed 
below. 
Method or Performance Specifications? This question 
was one of the key issues of this dispute. The owner 
contended that the contractor contracted to produce the 
ultimate design objective by application of its own skills 
and by construction methods of its own choice subject only 
to minimum standards prescribed for quality and workmanship. 
However, every detail of the pile work was spelled out, and 
thus, the specification was clearly a method specification. 
Is Specification Defective? Testimony of soils experts 
confirmed that mass movement and drifting of piles and pile 
groups was inevitable under the sequence of operations 
required by the specification. The specifications were 
clearly defective for the soil conditions present, and the 
finished product obtained from following the method 
prescribed was not suitable. 
Is Error Patent? After a review of all testimony, the 
court concluded that neither the government nor the 
contractor could have known that the pile design was 
defective. Clearly, the error was not patent. 
Did Contractor Assume Risk of Defective Specification? 
The contract contained standard government contract clauses. 
There was no express wording in the contract to shift the 
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risk of defective specifications to the contractor. 
Precompletion Loss? The pile movement was not caused 
by the contractor's failure to protect his work, and the 
piles were in their final position when the movement was 
taking place. Thus, precompletion loss was not a factor. 
Did Contractor Deviate? This rule was not questioned. 
There was no attempt to show that the contractor had not 
followed the specification. 
Conclusion 
Based upon the flow chart rules, the correct conclusion 
is that the contractor should recover. The court found that 
the contractor was entitled to the costs to restore the 
piles, plus the costs of delays to the overall project. 
The flow charts can be used to accurately predict the 
outcome of defective specification disputes. 
Validation of Rules 
To evaluate the validity of the rules developed by this 
research, ten appellate cases were selected and tested. In 
all ten cases, the results obtained using the rules were 
consistent with the court decision. In a few cases tested, 
there was not enough information provided in the record to 
conclusively determine that the case turned on the same key 
53 
issue. The ten cases tested were 
Blount Bros. Corp v. United States, 872 F.2d 1003 (1989). 
Commercial Contractors v. Sumar Canst. Inc., 302 So.2d 88 
(1974). 
Crookham and Vessels v. Larry Moyer Trucking, 699 s.w. 2d 
414 (1985). 
Fanning and Doorley Canst. Co. v. Geigy Chemical Corp., 305 
F.Supp. 650 (1969). 
Marine Colloids, Inc. v. M.D. Hardy, Inc., 433 A.2d 402 
(1981). 
Mayor and City, Etc. v. Clark-Dietz, Etc., 550 F.Sup. 610 
(1982). 
Neal and Company v. United States, 19 Cl.Ct. 463 (1990). 
Olson Plumbing and Heating v. United States, 502 F.2a 950 
(1979). 
SandT v. Harris, 789 P.2d 640 (1989). 
Sandkay Construction Co. v. State, 399 P.2d 1002 (1965). 
Chapter 5 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis provides the rules used by the courts to 
resolve defective specification disputes and discusses the 
differences between defective specifications and differing 
site conditions. This guide provides construction 
professionals with the information necessary to resolve 
defective specification disputes correctly in the field and 
avoid costly litigation. 
Summary 
Courts have developed two methods for resolving 
defective specification disputes. If a method specification 
is involved, the courts normally rely upon the theory of 
implied warranty. Performance specifications are resolved 
using the rules of impossibility. Flowcharts were developed 
for both method and performance specifications, and each is 
discussed in detail in Chapters 2 and 3, respectively. 
Differing site condition and defective specification 
claims are frequently difficult to distinguish. The primary 
differences are discussed in Chapter 4. 
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Method Specifications 
A method specification provides detailed instructions 
or design details which the contractor must follow. When 
this type of specification is used, there is an implied 
warranty that the method is possible to perform, and will 
result in a satisfactory end product. 
Method or Performance? The first step in resolving a 
defective specification dispute is to determine whether the 
specification is a method or performance specification. 
The key question is whether the contract allowed the 
contractor to choose the method or design which caused the 
problem. If the contract required the contractor to follow 
a particular method which proves to be the cause of the 
failure, the rules for method specifications will be used. 
Is the Specification Defective? A specification is 
considered defective if the product cannot be constructed by 
the required method, or the end result fails or does not 
meet end requirements. 
If the contractor is not able to construct the product 
by the method specified, he must show that the method is 
impossible. He will not be allowed to recover because the 
method proved to be more difficult than anticipated. 
If he is able to perform by the method specified, but the 
end product is deficient in some manner due to defects in 
the plans, the contractor will not be responsible. 
········-····--------------------------------------------
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Is Error Patent? An exception to the implied warranty 
exists when the defective specification is caused by a 
patent error. The contractor is obligated to call the error 
to the owner's attention. The error must be obvious and 
significant to be considered patent. 
Did Contractor Assume Risk of Defective Specification? 
Courts may find that express contract language shifted the 
risk of defective specifications to the contractor. 
Warranty and exculpatory clauses are the most common clauses 
where this occurs. Exculpatory clauses are generally valid, 
but are not favored by courts, and will only be enforced if 
they are very clear and specific. 
Warranty clauses normally cover only the contractor's 
material and workmanship. A few warranty clauses were 
. 
examined which courts determined were of sufficient scope to 
include defective specifications. However, courts are 
hesitant to shift the risk to the contractor when a detailed 
method has been specified in the contract. 
A few cases were discussed where other contract clauses 
have been held to overcome the implied warranty of the 
specifications. In these cases, the courts found that a 
clause or combination of clauses clearly shifted the risk of 
defective specifications to the contractor. 
Precompletion Loss The implied warranty does not place 
an obligation on the owner to design a structure such that 
it cannot be damaged or destroyP.n nurjna construction. 
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Normally, the contractor is responsible for precompletion 
loss. An exception to this rule exists when the finished 
product would also have failed. In this case, the loss is 
caused by compliance with the specification, and not the 
contractor's failure to protect his work. 
Did Contractor Follow Plans and Specifications? The 
final exception to the implied warranty rule is when the 
contractor deviates from the specifications. Even if the 
specification is defective, the contractor does not have the 
right to deviate without permission. If he does, he 
guarantees that the finished product will be acceptable. 
Did the Owner Approve the Deviation? If the owner 
approves a deviation, the contractor will not be 
responsible. In some cases, knowledge of a deviation may be 
construed as approval. If the owner accepts the finished 
structure knowing that the contractor has deviated, he is 
precluded from later seeking damages for those deviations. 
Performance Specifications 
A performance specification provides only the 
objective or standard to be achieved, and allows the 
contractor to choose methods and materials to achieve the 
desired outcome. When a contract utilizes a performance 
specification, the rules of impossibility are used. 
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Was Performance Impossible or Commercially Impractical? 
Contract law allows recovery if performance is commercially 
impractical as well as absolutely impossible. To be 
commercially impractical, the contract requirement must be 
so difficult or expensive that it clearly exceeds what the 
parties contemplated when the contract was made. 
In order to recover for impossibility, the contractor 
must show that no reasonable method was possible. 
Additionally, he must show that the impossibility was 
objective, and not due to his personal inability to perform. 
Did the Contractor Assume the Risk of Impossibility? 
Even though the specification is impossible, the contractor 
will not recover if he assumed the risk of impossibility. 
Risk can be shifted by express terms of the contract. 
Risk can also be shifted if the owner or designer has 
relied upon the contractor's knowledge or expertise. This 
situation can occur when a project is using a new or state 
of the art technique or product. To determine how to 
distribute risk, the court will determine which party 
possessed the greatest expertise in the .subject matter, or 
took the initiative in promoting a particular design. 
Defective Specifications versus 
Differing Site Conditions 
Sometimes when a dispute arises, it is difficult to 
determine if the dispute stems from a differing site 
condition or a defective specification. 
59 
The primary distinction between the two is that DSC 
disputes apply to information provided about the conditions 
to be encountered, while defective specification disputes 
center around instructions or details of construction. 
Differences in what the contractor must prove also 
differ. For differing site conditions, the contractor is 
able to recover for difficulty, while he will be unable to 
recover under defective specifications unless he can show 
that the work is impossible or commercially impractical. 
Conversely, the contractor must prove that he relied 
upon the information provided to recover under a DSC claim. 
With defective specifications, this proof is not necessary 
since he was bound to follow the plans and specifications. 
Legal Theories. Defective specification disputes are 
normally argued under implied warranty while DSC disputes 
are based upon misrepresentation. Occasionally, a 
contractor will base his claim on another theory. For 
example, defective specifications claims have been pursued 
under misrepresentation, and rules similar to those for DSC 
claims have been followed. Additionally, DSC claims are 
-------------------------------
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occasionally based upon the theory of implied warranty. In 
these cases, the rules of recovery are generally the same as 
those for misrepresentation. 
Finally, it is possible for both DSC and defective 
specification problems to be present in a single dispute. 
The contractor can recover for both if he can satisfy both 
sets of rules. 
Conclusions 
Based upon this research, it is concluded that the 
courts use a uniform set of rules to resolve defective 
specification disputes. The rules were found to be 
consistent for all jurisdictions, and they did not differ 
between public and private owners. 
The implied warranty of method specifications provides 
strong protection for contractors. There are few exceptions 
to the rule that the owner will be responsible for defects 
in the plans, and courts are hesitant to shift the risk of 
defective plans to the contractor. The primary risks to 
contractors occur when they ignore patent errors or deviate 
from the contract without permission. 
Performance specifications allow the contractor 
latitude in choosing the methods of construction, but also 
increase his responsibility for completing the work. To 
recover, he has more difficult criteria to meet. 
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Recommendations for Further Research 
The following area is recommended for further research: 
1. Architect and engineer liability for defective 
specifications. 
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Appendix A 
AIA Warranty Clause 
3.5.1 The Contractor warrants to the Owner and Architect 
that materials and equipment furnished under the Contract 
will be of good quality and new unless otherwise required or 
permitted by the Contract Documents, that the Work will be 
free from defects not inherent in the quality required or 
permitted, and that the Work will conform with the 
requirements of the Contract Documents. Work not conforming 
to these requirements, including substitutions not properly 
approved and authorized, may be considered defective. The 
Contractor's warranty excludes remedy for damage or defect 
caused by abuse, modifications not executed by the 
Contractor, improper or insufficient maintenance, improper 
operation, or normal wear and tear under normal usage. If 
required by the Architect, the Contractor shall furnish 
satisfactory evidence as to the kind and quality of 
materials and equipment. 
-AIA Document 201, General Conditions of the Contract for 
Construction, 1987, The American Institute of Architects, 
1735 New York Avenue, N.w., Washington D.C. 20006 
